NOTE ON GOVERNMENTAL PRODUCT
FAVORITISM
The Editor regrets keenly that unexpected difficulties prevent publication of
a completed analysis by an able commentator of state and federal legislation
effecting, and the economic implications of, governmental favoritism between
products.1 For just as elementary economic theory distinguishes between commodity
and substituted competition, so governmental restrictions on entry of products into
the market comprise not alone qualitative and quantitative limitations on given
products2 but, as well, marketing handicaps that advantage one product at the expense of a competing commodity.3 Such product favoritism ranges from the intended to the indirect to the unintentional, the legislative measure inducing it may
in its immediate incidence restrict the one commodity or promote the other; but in
any case government plays the favorite and varying economic impact follows in its
train.
Because the production of particular products, like the shaping of human character, is so largely conditioned by environmental factors, product favoritism is often
'Instances of product favoritism on the local level are collected in McIntire and Rhyne, Municipal
Legislative Barriers to a Free Market, infra this issue; effectuation of favoritism between competitive
products by administrative action is considered by Bane, Administrative Marketing Barriers, infra this
issue.
Silverman, Bennett and Lechliter, Control by Lcensing Over Entry Into the Market, supra this
issue, discuss some of the types of product restriction which adversely affect commodity competition.
Tucked away in the statute books of the American states are other types of such limitation. It is
common in liquor control legislation to find quantitative restrictions on the amount of intoxicants that
can be sold to any one person at one time. W. VA. CoDE (1937) §5907 (49) is illustrative. Quantitative limitation may also be legislatively decreed at the production stage. N. Y. Acare. & MARKETs LAW
§258j prohibits municipal authorities from approving any new milk dairy or plant or authorizing the
shipment of milk "from such premises or plant for sale or use within this state without satisfying the
commissioner that such proposed added milk supply is reasonably needed for such municipality . . ."
(ital. added). OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1937) tit. 52, §272 phrases the measurement of limitation expressl)
in terms of the self-interest of the industry involved: "The taking of crude oil or petroleum from any
oil bearing sand or sands . . . at a time when there is not a market demand therefor at the well at a
price equivalent to the actual value of such crude oil or petroleum is hereby prohibited. . . ." Restrictions on the use of natural resources are sometimes of a qualitative rather than a wholly quantitative
character. Thus DaL. CoDa (i935) §3008, and N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) §23:5-25 prohibit the conversion of food fish into oil or fertilizer; their use for other purposes is not limited. Legislation of
like tenor is to be found in state enactments directed at the control of human resources. Omo GrN.
CoDE (Throckmorton, 1940) §2228-1, prohibiting open-market sale of convict-made goods, and id.
§§12993 et seq., forbidding labor of children under sixteen years of age, are typical of limitations on
commodity competition imposed by reason of the particular labor group involved in their production.
'Silverman, Bennett and Lechliter, supra note 2, in the course of their discussion also cite instances of those governmental restrictions which effect favoritism in product competition. The importance
of this form of barrier merits, however, separate, extended treatment.
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an expression of geographical interests. There is, in short, a close interrelationship
between the type of barrier here under consideration and the more familiar interstate trade barrier. Butter's antipathy for margarine, translated through a powerful
lobby into widespread legislation restrictive of the latter's manufacture and sale, is the
outstanding illustration of this hybridism. 4 Numbered in the thirties are the states
which, following the celebrated federal excise of ten cents per pound,5 heavily tax
or otherwise prohibit the sale of colored margarine At least nine states have five
to fifteen cent excises on uncolored margarine as well, 7 a complete protection which
in recent years the dairy interests have wished from the federal government because
of the significant rise, in the face of the lesser prohibition, in the percentage of
margarine to butter consumption.'
When, some twenty-odd years ago, vegetable oils began to supplement animal
fats as the basic margarine constituent, feuds commenced within the margarine
family itself. Three of the important cattle-producing states lay an excise on all
margarine not containing a substantial percentage of animal fats. Search has revealed no Southern state counterpart favoring the vegetable oil base, probably because
Southern agriculture has an interest in cattle and hogs as well as in cottonseed.
Southern states have, however, joined in the trend toward elimination of the foreign
coconut oil in aid of products locally produced.' ° Thus Tennessee has just amended
its ten-year-old "all-out" law to exempt from that ten cent excise on all colored and
uncolored margarine, brands containing no oil ingredient save peanut, soybean,
cottonseed or corn and no fat ingredient other than beef, milk and neutral hog
lard." The domestic-oil coverage provided in this exemption, although quite common, is here and there expanded or contracted to effect favoritism as well between
continental American sources of vegetable oils.' 2 Butter loses legislative ground as
'Thus see the treatment of the margarine laws in Truitt, Interstate Trade Barriers in the United
i 53 STAT. 247-248, 26 U. S. C. A. §§23oo-23oi (1939).
States, supra this issue.
'Taylor, Burtis and Waugh, Barriers to Internal Trade in Farm Products (U. S. Dep't Agric., 1939)
i9; Barriersto Trade Between States (Marketing Laws Survey, 1939) 31-45.
'Ibid.; see also Truitt, supra note 4, at 213.
'Buell, Death by Tariff (Aug. 1938) 18 PORTUNE 32, 34. Aside from legislation of the type
described, use is made of onerous labelling requirements, prohibitions on sales to state institutions, etc.,
and heavy license fees required of manufacturers, dealers, dispensers and even consumers, in order to
aid butter. Provisions of these types are collected in Barriers to Trade Between States, supra note 6.
"Taylor, Burtis and Waugh, supra note 6, at 2o; Truitt, supra note 4, at 213.
"0See Truitt, supra note 4, at 213, citing from testimony before the T.N.E.C. The Federal Congress
also joined in this protectionist move both by limiting the amount of duty-free importations of coconut
oil and by imposing an excise of 3-5 cents on the first domestic processing of coconut and palm oils
in case an effort was made to import the oil-producing products. 53 STAT. 264, 26 U. S. C. A. 5247o
(1939).
"'Tenn. Laws 1941, c. 71, amending Tenn. Laws 1931, c. 19.
"2As ordinarily worded, the exemption imports a discrimination against pecan oil which Georgia
overcomes by expanding the favored group to include this type of oil. Colorado, Kansas and Minnesota,
failing to extend exemption to soybean oil, discriminate against a product not of the South but of sister
states in the midwest section. Barriers to Trade Between States, supra note 6, at 33, 34, 35, 37The Minnesota law, 3 MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1940 Supp.) §3855-1o, is unique in effecting a combination form, of exemption by taxing oleomargarine containing (s) less than 65% animal fats and/or
oils or (2) any fats and/or oils other than animal, milk, peanut, cottonseed, or corn. This explains
the reference to Minnesota in both the present note and note 9, supra.
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the demand for governmental protection of home products, taking its cue from the
pioneer dairy lobbyists, spreads to embrace other economic interests.
One area affected in this extension of protectionist philosophy has been the related one of cooking oils and shortenings. South Dakota in 1931 laid an excise of
five cents per pound on vegetable oils and vegetable cooking compounds except those
made of corn oilY3 Admittedly enacted to protect the home hog industry, it was
followed by what have been described as "repeated attempts .

.

. in Middle-western

States to pass laws designed to protect lard and corn oil against out-of-State substitutes, particularly cottonseed oil."114 The Iowa legislature in 1934 and again in
1937 considered legislation to tax lard substitutes. The later bill, calling for a prohibitive tax of $5 per pound on all shortening other than lard, precipitated a resolution in the Georgia legislature expressing that body's "regret" at the proposed action
of the sister commonwealth.1 5 Recent intense competition with corn oil, lard and
soybean oil is seriously threatening outlets for cottonseed oil, which has of late represented close to ten percent of the value of the Southern cotton crop.
Limitation of cotton acreage under the Federal Agricultural Adjustment Acts
of 19331' and 1938"7 has at the same time meant a corresponding decline for the

South in its cottonseed oil production. The consequent loss in the oil market has
been taken up largely by expansion in soybean production, which is confined for
the most part to the East Central States 1 Removal of the surplus peanut crop from
the edible trade through diversion to the oil market, effected by what is now the
Surplus Marketing Administration, has enabled Southern farmers to make up a
part of their loss in this market occasioned by the enforced reduction in cottonseed
oil. But peanut oil averages less than one percent of the total of fats and oils produced; nor is it profitable to sell peanuts for oil at prevailing prices.1" Of similarly
less direct but albeit cognizable geographical favoritism are numerous provisions to
be found among the exemption statutes of state property taxation. Thus Wyoming
grants a five-year exemption to property used in the manufacture of beet sugar or
beet sugar products. 0 Some exemption provisions are so inclusive, however, that
their purpose is more to stimulate a general economic development rather than to
foster one product over another. This appears to be true of Mississippi,21 which
" S. D. Laws 1931, c. 259, repealed by S. D. Laws 1933, c. 183.
"'Taylor, Burtis and Waugh, supra note 6, at 30. See Wesson (Sept. 1939) 20 Forun 67, for a
discussion of the South's problem viewed through the corporate eyes of the manufacturers of Snowdrift
and Wesson Oil.
Neither Iowa bill was enacted. Compare the joint resolution
'"Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 2190-2191.
adopted by the Wisconsin legislature in an effort to placate the cotton states over Wisconsin's hostility
toward margarine. See Truitt, supra note 4, at 217, n. 39.
16 48 STAr. 31 (933).
"52 SrTr. 3x, 7 U. S. C. A. §§1281-1407 (1938).
16 See SaN. REP. No. 147, 7 7 th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) at 2.

9 Ibid.
" Wyo. Rnv. STAT.

(Supp.

1939)

S15.o5 A.

Present possibilities in the competition of sugar

with corn derivatives are indicated in Corn Products (Sept. 1938) 18 FoR'TuN 55.
2"-Miss. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1938) c. 6r, S323. Cf., however, id.

five years and cottonseed for one.
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has been a leader among Southern states in efforts to lure industry across the Mason
2
and Dixon line?

State and federal expenditures for highway construction afford a classic illustration of geographical favoritism in product competition effected indirectly-and
doubtless unintentionally-through an economic chain of causation. Good roads
are responsible for the competitive advantage which motor carriers now enjoy in
some respects over rail transportation. Emergence of the motor truck as a significant means of carriage has, in turn, been enormously advantageous to the seafood
industry. Oysters, especially, are now placed in Midwestern towns in active competition with inland substitutes.23
With other instances of product favoritism, on the other hand, the geographical
factor either has receded into the background or is completely absent. Georgia now
exempts from its unit taxes on merchandise vending machines, machines dispensing
nuts grown within the United States; North Carolina, machines "that vend solely
peanuts and candies made of peanuts containing fifty percent or more peanuts."2'
Georgia, though it has a definite economic interest in the pecan trade, extends the
exemption to all other members of the nut family. The Tar Heel state is one of
the great peanut-producing areas; yet of the products with which it can be said the
lowly peanut "competes" in the edible trade, as many are native as are foreign.
Similarly, two states taxing soft drinks exempt from the provisions of their statutes
pure fruit and vegetable juices. 5 By imposing on distributors of fuel oil an excise
tax not balanced by any comparable exaction applicable to distributors of coal, wood
and other competing fuels,2" the State of Washington plumped for a form of
product favoritism which as to it must have been motivated by functional rather
than geographical considerations. It has been said that John L. Lewis recently
proposed a federal tax of similar purport as one possible cure for the sickness in the7
bituminous coal industry which competition of other fuels helped to produce?
The same authority declares that recent legislation proposed for federal control of
the petroleum industry would, if enacted, have empowered the Department of the
Interior to prohibit the use of crude oil for fuel.28
Not only have fuel oil's competitors been accorded legislative succor; at the other
"See

Note (1940) 9 Duxe BAR Ass'N J. 15.
1 See the testimony of John V. Lawrence, T.N.E.C. Hearings, 7 6th Cong., 2d Sess. (94')

Pt. 29,

at 16033.
24Ga. H. B. 5o5, 1941; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1939) §7880(61).
" S. C. Acts 1939, act 346, §96; W. Va. Laws 1939, C. 119, §30.

In extending the exemption

only to wholesale and retail groceries selling the juices the West Virginia law at the same time effects
a discrimination in methods and channels of distribution. This phase of the barrier question is analysed
in Cook, Legislative Restrictions on Marketing Integration; Gould, Legislative Intervention in the Conflict
Between Orthodox and Direct-Selling Distribution Channels, both infra this issue.
"Wash. Laws 1939, c. 186. The legislation, dating back to Wash. Laws 1935, c. 18o, 78, was
condemned as violative of the equal protection guaranty in State of Washington v. Inland Empire
Refineries, 3 Wash. (2d) 651, ioi P. (2d) 975, ceart. denied, 6x Sup. Ct. 395 (1940).
"PETTENGILL, SMOKE SCREEN (1940)

113.

On the effectuation of barriers through the intended or usurped exercise of administrative
"Ibid.
powers of discretion, see Bane, supra note x.
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end of the petroleum scale gasoline faces some actual, and the threat of much more,
legislative partiality for power alcohol. In the initial phases of the competitive
struggle, however, legislation may actually operate indirectly to favor the petroleum
industry2 9 This is well illustrated by a 1935 development in South Dakota. That
state has long required inspection of petroleum products, and prohibited sale as
gasoline of any product found to fail the statutory specifications. In the year mentioned the state law was amended in order "that gasoline sold in this state ... may
be blended with completely denatured Ethyl alcohol .. ,,s0But 1935 saw more

than legislative equality attained for the new use of agricultural commodities;
Nebraska that same year embarked on a policy it still pursues of suckling the infant
competitive product through a technique of tax favoritism. The original enactment
effected preferential taxation of blended motor fuels by excluding the alcohol content of alcohol-gasoline mixtures from the definition of taxable motor fuel.3 ' A
1939 supplemental enactment exempted the entire mixture from tax when used for
other than highway or aircraft purposes, except for that portion of the tax diverted
to social security3
Administrative complexity and confusion growing out of
simultaneous enforcement of these two laws possibly grounds a proposal now
before Nebraska's unicameral legislature to exempt all alcohol-blend gasoline from

the present five cent motor fuel tax, imposing upon it instead a differential tax
of three cents3 3
Agitation commenced in recent years and extending down into the present
months has for its purpose the extension of this brand of governmental product
favoritism to other states and to the Federal Congress. These proposals, reaching
bill stage to receive legislative consideration, are significant straws in the wind despite
their failure of enactment. For not only is their number far from small; nearly
every one would build a barrier wall higher than that so far constructed by the
Cornhusker state.3 4 Some have called for complete exemption;3 5 by far the greater
number of state proposals and half the federal bills would adopt the European
pattern 8 of compulsory blending? 7 It seems reasonable to believe that some at
" Compare the Seattle ordinance, which purposely discriminated in favor of liquid fuel dealers,
cited in McIntire and Rhyne, Municipal Legislative Barriers to a Free Market, inIra this issue.
" S. D. Laws '935, c. x69, p. 270, now S. D. CODE ANN. (1939) §22.1506.
"Neb. Lawe 1935, c. i, now NEB. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §66"401.
"Neb. Laws 1939, c. 82, now NEB. CoM. STAT. (Supp. 1939) §66-431. Since at present 20 percent

of the revenue from the regular five cents per galloa motor fuel tax is so diverted, in effect
a one cent
per gallon tax is levied on blended gasoline when used for the purposes specified, as against the five
cent tax required of petroleum gasoline. Id. §66-4o5 levies the tax for social security.
"Neb. L. B. 88, 1941. (Feb. 194) 1 (No. 4) STATE TAx REV. 3.
" Neb. L. B. I, 1939, would have required compulsory blending whenever there existed a sufficient
supply of ethyl alcohol. Amer. Petroleum Industries Comm., Summary o! Acobol-Gasoline Legislation
(1941).

3"Rep. Harrington, 75 th Cong. (complete exemption); Sen. Gurney, 76th Cong. (semble); S. B.
552, 76th Cong. (semble); H. R. 2559, 76th Cong. (semble); cf. Idaho H. B. 218, 1941 (exemption
of alcohol content only). Data from Amer. Petroleum Industries Comm., supra note 34.
"See Legis. (1937) 22 IowA L. REV. 736, 750.
" Iowa H. F. 96, S. F. 364, 1939 (police power); Mich. H. B. 294, S. B. 275, 1939 (semble);
Minn. H. B. 1430, S. B. 1305, 1939 (semble); Wash. H. B. 567, 1939 (semble); Wash. H. B. 412,
1941 (semble; highway use only); Rep. Knutson, 75 th Cong. (prohibitory tax); H. R. 175, 7 6th Cong.
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least of these schemes would have flowered into law were it not for the fact the
National Farm Chemurgic Council and interests allied with it have elected to press
the farm chemurgy movement wholly in terms of the inherent economic power
of the new products to compete successfully in the market place.
This attitude must necessarily account to some extent also for the relative absence of governmental effort to foster other phases of this movement, which, roughly
speaking, pits agricultural commodities against those that are the product of the
extractive industries and of established industrial processes 8s The phenomenal rise
of the soybean has, so far as search reveals, enlisted only an instance of administrative favoritism2 9 Nor does there appear to be-one would scarcely expect
it-any evidence of legislative intervention to protect accepted drug sources from
the likely competition of farm wastes only quite recently translated by the chemist's
modern alchemy into substances having significant medicinal properties. But while
there is to date little actual governmental favoritism in this immediate sense, legislation promotive of the farm chemurgy movement as a whole, and thus indirectly
of product favoritism, is not uncommon. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938"° established four great regional laboratories for extensive research into new
uses and new and extended markets for farm commodities and their by-products.
Through their agricultural colleges and stations, several states are investing large
sums toward the same end.4 1
Federal limitations, through the two Agricultural Adjustment Acts,42 of the
production of basic farm commodities has effected direct favoritism in commodity
competition only as a by-product. Limitation of cotton acreage, stimulating a significant expansion in peanut production, would presumably have advantaged the
lowly goober beyond the slight gain realized through diversion to the oil market
4
had the edible-trade demand kept pace with that expansion. Failing to do so, 3
there resulted a mounting surplus of peanuts which has now induced legislation extending the marketing quota system to this commodity 4 That the federal agri(police power and prohibitory taxation); H. R. 9582, 76th Cong. (police power over interstate commerce); H. R. 35, 77th Cong. (semble); H. R. 2819, 77th Cong. (police power and prohibitory
taxation). Data from Amer. Petroleum Industries Comm., supra note 34.
"Although the product competition engendered by farm chemurgy in broad outline is one on the
functional level, nevertheless legislative succor at times shows definite traces of geographical protectionism. Thus of the nine state bills listed in notes 35 and 37, supra, six stipulated for ethyl alcohol produced from agricultural commodities grown within the state. The present Nebraska proposal, cited
supra note 33, although adhering to existing legislation in specifying that the farm products may be
grown anywhere in the United States, excepts black-strap molasses. Regional interests are also reflected
in the latest Washington State proposal, supra note 37, which specifies that the ethyl alcohol may come
from waste or surpluses in farm crops, coal mines, timber, etc.
"'See Bane, supra note i. This administrative ruling concerned the use of soybean oil in paint;
soybean plastics have apparently not provoked legislative retaliation on the part of the products being
displaced.
do 52 STAT. 31, 37, 7 U. S. C. A. §1292 (1938).

"xAfurther promotive device is to be found in North Carolina's limited tax exemption of agricultural products, just enacted. N. C. S. B. io6, 1941. Gould, supra note 25, at 322, finds in legislation
directed against peddlers and transient merchants, numerous instances of exemptions favoring such
products.
"Notes 16 and 17, supra.
"3SEN. REP. No. 147, supra note x8, at 3.
"Pub. L. No. 27, 7 7 th Cong., istSess. (1941).
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cultural program has, however, unintentionally produced direct favoritism between
products is attested by the experience of the cotton industry under the first agricultural adjustment act. Unintended favoritism arose there as a consequence of
the enforcement of the tax imposed upon the first domestic processing of raw cotton,
the revenue from which was to be used to pay benefits to the cotton farmer.
"The effect of this tax was to increase in varying amounts the price of all cotton
products subject thereto and those cotton products which were in competition with
non-cotton products were placed at a serious competitive disadvantage. Such disadvantage was particularly marked in competition between the cotton product and
paper bags and other paper containers, some rayon products, paper towels, noncotton cord and other binding material, paper tapes of various kinds, paper shades
and paper napkins and table covers.
"The Act itself contained provisions which were designed to afford relief by
providing for a compensating tax on the competing non-cotton product where it
could be proved that the tax was causing or would cause a shift away from the use
of the cotton product. It was found by experience, however, that while a measure
of relief was gained in a few instances, the administrative difficulties and the prob.
lems of proving to the satisfaction of the administrative agency that such shifts were
taking place, effectually barred any real relief in most cases.
"Moreover, where a compensating tax was imposed on the competing non-cotton
product it was frequently found that such product was in turn placed at a competitive disadvantage as against another non-cotton product, although the second
product did not compete directly with the cotton product. With regard to protection of domestic cotton products against increased competition from imported
cotton products, the situation was somewhat more satisfactory; there an additional
tax was placed on the import of the foreign products approximately equal to the
tax burden which the domestic products were bearing.
"After the tax was removed following the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States as to its unconstitutionality, many of the markets lost to cotton
products as a result of the tax have probably not been wholly regained; the public
during the interim having become used to the competitive product. This last, however, is a matter which is almost impossible to measure in mathematical terms and
therefore cannot be stated categorically, although it is the confirmed opinion of most
of the manufacturers of the cotton products involved.
"The experience of the Industry under the tax has been such as to compel the
conclusion that no one product of an agricultural commodity can be singled out to
bear the burden of a tax without necessarily placing it at a competitive disadvantage, directly and indirectly, with a large number of non-taxed products and setting
up a chain of causation which tends to dislocate the operation of the normal competitive system:
Adequate appraisal of the economic implications of governmental favoritism in
"'Statement from the Cotton-Textile Institute, March 19, 1941.
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product competition requires extended examination at the hands of skilful analysts
of economic phenomena. Only a few generalized observations can be here made.
Clearly governmental marketing barriers of this type are not to be categorically
condemned; product favoritism of each variety must be separately brought before

the bar of economic judgment to be examined in terms of its character and its
impact upon the public weal. Geographical favoritism, grounded as it is in provincial self-interest, may be more vicious than functional discrimination; 48 functional
favoritism, in turn, may be good, bad or neither depending on its direct or collateral
impact and on whether it is in aid of new or established product interests. Antimargarine legislation, preventing or discouraging as it does the consumption by
lower income groups of a low-cost, 47 yet equally nutritious48 butter substitute, can-

not be justified on the ground of the importance of the dairy industry. Especially
must this be the judgment when it is not at all clear that that industry stands to
gain materially from this barrier action.4 9 If any discrimination of the old against
the new can be justified on such an argument, sick bituminous coal would stand
to claim the legislative crutch. Yet even so, actual and proposed legislation looking
to this curative for black diamond's economic aches stands suspect on counts
analogous to those recited in the indictment of governmental favoritism toward
butter. Legislative obstructionism directed at other new competitive products may
similarly result in the freezing of prices at arbitrary levels. Such is possibly the
case with municipal efforts to prevent introduction of the paper milk container,
which offers economies in the cost of milk distribution.50 Or, although not depriving the consumer of an effective, less expensive substitute, such governmental
action may deny him the advantages of an improved article at little or no increase
in cost. That this is the situation in the building field is the verdict to be found
from evidence and opinion laid before the Temporary National Economic Committee.5 ' Like margarine, the articles are more accurately classed as necessities than
as luxuries; and the private subsidies in aid of vested interests, governmentally exacted under guise of a public interest, fall heaviest on the lower income groups.
When government puts the shoe of favoritism on the other foot, economic analysis must carefully weigh the consumer's stake in the new style. If any merit remains in the "infant industry" argument, public interest would not appear to be
the loser in governmental encouragement of research in farm chemurgy, or in the
"aOn geographical favoritism, whether of persons or products, contrast the attitude of Truitt, supra
note 4, and Silverman, Bennett and Lechliter, supra note 2, with that expressed by McIntire and Rhyne,
supra noto i.
7

PABST, BUTTER AND OLEOMARGARINE (1937) C. 3 contains data on the relative prices of butter
and margarine; see id. at 84 for comment on the significance of low prices for margarine.
The
4" See the excellent discussion in SNODGRASS, MARGARINE AS A BuTTER SUBSTITUTE (1930) C. 14.

butter industry's thesis that margarine must be discouraged because detrimental to the public as compared with butter is belied by data on violations of pure food laws. See Truitt, supra note 4, at 216,
n. 35," See comment of Taylor, Burtis and Waugh, supra note 6, at 27-28.
" See Silverman, Bennett and Lechliter, supra note 2, at 261, n. r3o, quoting from a recent editorial

in the Washington Post.

" Id. at 246, quoting from the T. N. E. C. Hearings.
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rephrasing of such definitional requirements as North Dakota's specifications for
motor fuel to legalize the use of products unknown at the time of original draftsmanship. Indeed, agriculture's handicap as against industry in the present economy,
now fashionably expressed in terms of contrasting rigid and flexible price structures,
may well justify differential taxation of those farm commodities that seek to compete in common markets with industrial products. But forced consumption of the
new product, despite advanced prices necessitated by higher costs of production
possibly accompanied by inferior quality, is a horse of another color. With the economic picture of power alcohol abounding in such consumer shadows, 2 only the
strongest emphasis on the urgency of conserving remaining petroleum resources
against the rainy days that seem to lie ahead can square such governmental favoritism with public interest. For an economy that remains dedicated to the idea of
a free competitive market, governmental playing of favorites among competing
products, like public creation of other forms of marketing barrier, is a game which
the common weal can indulge in but seldom if it is not to suffer the economic
and social consequences so quickly condemned when private interests load the dice
without benefit of police protection.
2

Summary data on the cost and quality of alcohol-blend gasoline may be found in Legis. (x937)

22 Iowa L. REv. 736, 747-749.

